Analysis: The Rise and Rise of the House of Farage

by Alex Chalmers
Everyone expected the UK Independence Party to perform well in Thursday’s elections, but few accurately predicted the scale of their apparent surge in support. Almost a quarter of those who voted, seemingly disillusioned with all three main parties, turned out to vote for a party that had previously been dismissed as a collection of “fruitcakes, loonies, and closet racists”, as well as “clowns”. However, in many ways, the government have only themselves to blame for this high protest vote. Whilst it is important not to dismiss UKIP, it is equally foolish to interpret these results as a fundamental realignment of British politics or an end to the three-party system. Such shock results are not without historic precedent and as parties such as UKIP become more successful, greater scrutiny can bring internal problems and divisions to the fore.

Whilst Nigel Farage may not like to admit it, the UKIP bandwagon is fuelled by protest rather than principle. People resent high unemployment, a stagnant economy, and a government struggling to get its act together. This does not mean they have all become hardened Eurosceptics and ‘civic nationalists’. People feel that their opinions are being ignored and that voting UKIP is the best means of getting the government’s attention. UKIP paints itself as the party on the side of ordinary people, who are prepared to say what all the others are too scared to say, but as one UKIP supporter admitted, “it’s easy to do straight talking when you’re not in power”. Rather than advocating specific policies, UKIP attacks political correctness and the so-called political class, whilst advancing its own brand of ‘common sense’. It is easy to see how this approach is tempting, as people can use the party as an outlet for their anger without any accompanying ideological baggage. 

However, this means that UKIP’s support is potentially fragile and transient. Even a small change in the political winds could cause the party to haemorrhage support as the ideology of “a plague on both your houses” only works in specific circumstances. Two of the main parties are leading a failing government, whilst the third is struggling to win over a sceptical public. If there is a reverse of fortune for either side, the motivation for a protest vote will diminish sharply. Furthermore, whilst UKIP repeatedly reminds us that it is taking votes from all parties, around three-quarters of their support comes from ex-Conservatives who are disillusioned with coalition and David Cameron’s ‘modernisation’. Many of these voters, whilst unenthusiastic about the Tories, would consider switching back to prevent Ed Miliband reaching Number 10. Polling conducted by Lord Ashcroft shows that 60% of UKIP considerers rank David Cameron the highest out of the three main party leaders and overwhelmingly trust Cameron and Osborne more with the economy than Miliband and Balls. More than half of these considerers are concerned by the idea that “my voting for UKIP would make it more likely that the big party I like the least would end up in government”.   

UKIP’s own record suggests that it will struggle to transform its support at a local and European level into votes at a general election. Despite achieving a strong 16% of the vote in European elections in 2004 and 2009, UKIP failed to make a breakthrough in the general elections in the following years. History is not on the party’s side either. The Greens secured 15% of the vote in the 1989 European elections, only to see their support later evaporate. Past right-wing protest movements have also failed to make a permanent mark on the political landscape. In France, Pierre Poujade led a right-wing populist movement that employed much of the same anti-establishment rhetoric as Nigel Farage and UKIP does today. Poujade saw himself as standing up for French identity and the common man against the government, with much of his support coming from those living in declining towns who harked back to some golden age where things were supposedly different. They blamed globalization and economic modernization for their problems, just as many UKIP voters hold immigration responsible for what they perceive to be a national decline. The Poujadist movement shocked the political establishment by winning 52 seats in the 1956 elections, yet in the next set of elections two years later, his party completely disappeared from the scene. Internal splits, a lack of discipline, and the extreme views of some of its representatives (one of whom was the young Jean-Marie Le Pen) all played a role in discrediting the party. More importantly, Poujade’s party could offer a means of protest, but it had no real solutions to alleviate the concerns of its supporters. In many ways, Farage is following Poujade’s path. He denounces the political class, but presents a vague, uncosted list of ‘aspirations’ based on the existence of a seemingly bottomless pit of money rather than concrete pledges. Leaked emails show how worried some senior UKIP figures are, with MEP Godfrey Bloom warning that, “our website will have no policies at all on there for 10 years” if the party continues with its current policy-making process. UKIP is almost certain to face greater media scrutiny and their present policy vacuum may well cost them support at the next general election.

This does not mean the main parties need only sit back and wait for the threat to disappear. It is tempting to follow a policy of ‘triangulation’ where politicians pander to concerns about immigration, hoping to undermine their opponents and push them rightwards into politically unacceptable territory. Instead of wrong-footing anti-immigration politicians, this approach merely lends their cause greater credence and publicity. Labour attempted this strategy to counter the rise of the BNP at the local level, but to no success. David Blunkett accused immigrants and asylum-seekers of ‘swamping’ schools with their children and Tony Blair’s stance on asylum-seekers was described as ‘chilling’ and ‘absolutely appalling’ by refugee charities. These attempts to sound tough on immigration did nothing to prevent strong BNP showings in Amber Valley, Stoke, Burnley, and Barking and Dagenham. The tide only turned against the BNP following intense media scrutiny and effective grassroots campaigns by groups such as Hope Not Hate. UKIP are clearly not the BNP, but adopting their rhetoric will do absolutely nothing to undermine them, instead allowing them to frame the debate.

UKIP may currently be a force on the UK’s political landscape, but there is a lot to suggest this will only be a temporary phase. UKIP is yet to peak and a very good showing at the European elections next year is only to be expected. If the government or opposition manage to solve the problems that motivate people to protest, then the party will be deprived of its oxygen and recede to its previous fringe status. Capitulating and adopting its anti-immigration and Eurosceptic rhetoric only serves to feed it.